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Abstract: This research will argue about which theory of mind between 
Searle’s and Dennett’s can better explain human consciousness. Initially, 
distinctions between dualism and materialism will be discussed ranging from 
substance dualism, property dualism, physicalism, and functionalism. In this 
part, the main issue that is tackled in various theories of mind is revealed. It 
is the missing connection between input stimulus (neuronal reactions) and 
behavioral disposition: consciousness. Then, the discussion will be more 
specific on Searle’s biological naturalism and Dennett’s multiple drafts 
model as the two attempted to answer the issue. The differences between 
them will be highlighted and will be analyzed according to their relation to 
their roots: dualism and materialism. The two theories will be examined on 
how each answer the questions on consciousness. 
 
It will be revealed in this research that consciousness can have different 
brands. Dennett’s as one brand, operational consciousness, and Searle’s as 
another, sui generis consciousness. It shall be concluded that Searle’s theory of 
mind outweighs Dennett’s if we take the two theories to answer what 
human consciousness is. This is due to two reasons: (1) Sufficiency of 
Explanation, where Searle has more comprehensively explained what 
consciousness is and (2) Pragmatic Picture of Reality, where Searle’s theory 
can fit more in the social reality.  
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onsciousness is a complex theme not 
only in philosophy, but also in the hard 
sciences. Psychology makes an attempt 
in fully understanding the topic, but what they 
find are only traces of descriptions those which 
we can correlate with what consciousness is. The 
descriptive question tailing the theme 
consciousness is still an on-going debate. What 
is this consciousness they are talking about? Is it 
some sort of metaphysical entity? Is it just a 
product of neuron firings just waiting to be 
interpreted? Is it a processed data, or maybe just 
a process? As we use consciousness in an 
ordinary language, it means the state of being 
alert of one’s self and one’s environment, thus 
the sub-thesis that confines the attribution of 
the term to the living things. It also pertains to 
‘having knowledge’ thus the sub-thesis that only 
animals (or only humans) are attributed with 
consciousness. But, these sub-thesis are not final 
in the sense that they are entirely true and 
entirely acceptable. Debates on consciousness 
continue to grow and sub-thesis such as above 
are simultaneously proven and contested. One 
C 
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of the most popular correspondences that 
inquire about consciousness is between John 
Searle and Daniel Dennett.  
We know consciousness. We are very much 
aware of it. But, with all these knowledge we 
have of consciousness, we lack full 
understanding of it. John Searle and Daniel 
Dennett are two philosophers of mind with 
contrasting opinions concerning consciousness. 
While Searle claims that consciousness consists 
of qualia, Dennett claims it does not. This paper 
shall investigate which theory then can better 
explain human consciousness.  
Dualism and Materialism 
Dualism and materialism are contrasting theories 
especially when it comes to their description of 
consciousness. Dualism treats consciousness as 
independent from the physical body. It creates a 
clear distinction between mind and body. 
Materialism, being simpler, treats consciousness 
as being a part of the brain system. It discards 
the premise that there is such a thing called 
‘mind’ (or if there is, it is reducible to physics) 
and everything is just a function or a part of the 
physical body. On the one hand, since dualism 
assumes an entity independent from the physical 
body, it consequently implies the possibility of a 
soul or a soul-like entity independent from the 
physical body. On the other hand, materialism 
denies this. Since everything is a part of a 
physical body, there cannot be any entity 
independent from it  thus the denial of a soul 
independent from the body. 
Writings on dualism can be traced back to the 
time of Plato. Plato described the mind as an 
ideal and abstract thing and thus it belongs to a 
world he intuited — the ‘world of Forms’. This 
mind is what we call ‘soul’. It is there as we are 
living, and as we die, it stays in the world of 
Forms. This world of Forms houses all the ideal 
things not only the concept soul, but so are the 
concepts love, justice, and other ideal concepts 
such as ‘chairness’, ‘tableness’, and ‘treeness’. 1 
Dualism is more explained by a later 
philosopher Rene Descartes. For him, there are 
two kinds of substance in the world: the mental 
and the physical. He described the mind as non-
physical substance distinct from the body, and 
the body as a non-mental substance distinct 
from the mind. We can see how they are distinct 
from looking at their features.2 
Mental   Physical 
1. Indivisible Infinitely 
Divisible 
 
2. Free    Determined 
 
3. Known directly by means  Known Indirectly 
of Cogito Ergo 
Sum3 
First, the mental aspect is indivisible. We cannot 
cut or group the mental into smaller groups or 
pieces. Meanwhile, the physical aspect is 
infinitely divisible. This view of the physical 
aspect is closely related to scientific theories 
originating from Leucippus and Democritus 
stating that everything is divisible into the tiniest 
particles called atomos. Second, the mental aspect 
is free while the physical aspect is determined. 
The distinction is best illustrated as: while the 
physical aspect can be physically measured thus 
the limits we can perceive it bears, mental aspect 
comprises ideas, thoughts or imaginations—
abstract things which are physically 
immeasurable.  Third, the mental aspect is 
known directly by means of Cogito Ergo Sum 
while the physical aspect is known indirectly. 
Descartes’ thesis Cogito Ergo Sum means in 
English “I think, therefore I am.” It is the first 
certainty to cure his skepticism. He found 
himself while meditating according to his book 
Meditations. He said: 
But finally here I am, having insensibly 
reverted to the point I desired, for, 
since it is now manifest to me that even 
bodies are not, properly speaking 
known by the senses or by the faculty 
of imagination, but by the 
understanding only, and since they are 
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not known from the fact that they are 
seen or touched, but only because they 
are understood, I see clearly that there 
is nothing which is easier for me to 
know than my mind.4 
Descartes’ theory poses different problems. First 
is, “How can the two interact?” or “ How can 
the two causally affect each other?” What 
Descartes only provided were the descriptions 
of the mind and body—that they are distinct—
missing the question in between, the interaction 
between the mind and the body. Second is 
whether the mind is really free or not. The 
notion of the will is in question since if the mind 
is free and the body determined, it looks as if the 
freedom of the mind makes no difference. 5 
Third is the problem we have when we think of 
other minds; since, only the self’s mind can be 
known directly by means of Cogito. This will in 
turn bring forth another question: "Can we 
really know anything about the external world?”. 
The fourth and last problem is general to 
dualism, that which supposes a metaphysical 
necessity—a soul that is removed from the 
body. Cartesian dualism is contemporarily 
known as substance dualism. This kind of 
dualism is largely contested, but a few 
philosophers stick with the theory such as W.D. 
Hart and Richard Swinburne. 
The quest in finding what is consciousness is 
still in discussion as most has thrown away what 
Descartes has theorized—largely due to 
inconsistencies and lack of explanations. 
Another more modest version of dualism arose 
in the contemporary era. Property dualism 
discards the ontological weight Substance 
dualism bears. Property dualism bears its 
dualistic characteristics in the distinction 
between two aspects or properties. One 
property is the physical property while the other 
property is the conscious property. These 
conscious properties are neither identical with 
nor reducible to physical properties but can be 
instantiated by the same things that instantiated 
with physical properties. One example is a 
Chalmers’ version of property dualism. He 
claims that conscious properties are on a par 
with fundamental physical properties such as 
electromagnetic charge. The interaction is 
bounded by physical and causal laws, but their 
existence is neither dependent upon, nor derived 
from any other properties.6 
Monism, contrary to dualism, claims that there is 
only the mental, known as idealism, or only the 
physical, known as materialism. Idealism, 
popularized by Berkeley, 7  holds that only the 
immaterial mental substances do exist. Serious 
objections for it arose as it utterly denies the 
existence of the external world.8 The opposite, 
known as materialism, has a more general 
support as it closes itself in with science and it 
has less metaphysical problems to think about. It 
discards the existence of a mind distinct from 
the body and presumes that there are only the 
physical aspects.9 Materialism, in its quest to find 
what consciousness is, brought forth several, 
different, and contesting theories, one of these is 
behaviorism. One variation of behaviorism, 
methodical behaviorism is foundational to 
psychology. Another variation, logical 
behaviorism, is a theory of mind claiming that 
any statement about the mind is equivalent in 
meaning to a set of statements about behavior.10 
Although a theory solely based on the 
physical/bodily aspects, behaviorism failed to 
find the causal connection between the mental 
and the physical. It still bears the same 
deficiency dualism has in explaining 
consciousness. Also, its main thesis can be easily 
defeated with counterexample as there is an 
instance wherein what one thinks is different 
from what one’s behavior is. As an attempt to 
improve behaviorism, physicalism claims that 
physical states are identical to mental states. 11 
This would mean that there is no more need for 
the causal connection between the mental and 
the physical, since they are one and the same. 
Another theory materialism brought forth for 
the inquiry of consciousness is functionalism. In 
functionalism, everything is reduced to functions 
which are mostly mathematical appropriations 
and expositions. 12  It claims that there is an 
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internal causal relation among the elements of 
the system, of the mind. On the one hand, 
functionalism is being treated by philosophers as 
a black box since we do not know anything of 
its internal processing. 13  On the other hand, 
some philosophers claim that those internal 
processing consists of computation, as in 
advanced computers, thus the said possibility of 
conscious machines.14 
Searle’s Biological Naturalism 
Searle’s theory of mind coined as Biological 
Naturalism begins by claiming that 
consciousness is a biological phenomenon, 
putting it at the ranks of digestion or 
photosynthesis.15 It is distinct from the physical 
aspects, but it is not a soul-like entity that has no 
clear connection with the body. The relationship 
is that: consciousness, the mind, is a higher-level 
biological phenomenon that is caused by the 
lower-level neuronal processes, or the physical 
aspect. 16  To grasp Searle’s theory of 
consciousness, we must also articulate clear 
dichotomies that his theory bears. One is the 
dichotomy between mental as higher level 
phenomena and neurophysiologic as that lower 
level. His theory opposes the thesis that 
consciousness is reducible to computations. The 
thesis claiming that consciousness is reducible to 
computations holds that if that is the case, then 
it is also possible for computer programs to be 
programmed for it to be conscious. That is not 
the case for Searle. For him, mental states are 
real, irreducible and cannot be doubted as also 
according to the Cartesian principle Cogito Ergo 
Sum. Additionally, he explained this by showing 
another dichotomy, the dichotomy between the 
syntax and semantics. Starting with a thought 
experiment, the ‘Chinese Room Argument’, the 
thought is as follows: 
Imagine that a bunch of computer 
programmers has written a program 
that will enable a computer to simulate 
the understanding of Chinese. So, for 
example, if the computer is given a 
question in Chinese, it will match the 
question against its memory, or data 
base, and produce appropriate answers 
to the questions in Chinese. Suppose, 
for the sake of argument that the 
computer's answers are as good as 
those of a native Chinese speaker. Now 
then, does the computer, on the basis 
of this, understand Chinese, does it 
literally understand Chinese, in the way 
that Chinese speakers understand 
Chinese? Well, imagine that you are 
locked in a room, and in this room are 
several baskets full of Chinese symbols. 
Imagine that you (like me) do not 
understand a word of Chinese, but that 
you are given a rule book in English for 
manipulating these Chinese symbols. 
The rules specify the manipulations of 
the symbols purely formally, in terms of 
their syntax, not their semantics. So the 
rule might say: 'Take a squiggle-squiggle 
sign out of basket number one and put 
it next to a squoggles quoggle sign from 
basket number two.' Now suppose that 
some other Chinese symbols are passed 
into the room, and that you are given 
further rules for passing back Chinese 
symbols out of the room. Suppose that 
unknown to you the symbols passed 
into the room are called 'questions' by 
the people outside the room, and the 
symbols you pass back out of the room 
are called 'answers to the questions'. 
Suppose, furthermore, that the 
programmers are so good at designing 
the programs and that you are so good 
at manipulating the symbols, that very 
soon your answers are indistinguishable 
from those of a native Chinese speaker. 
There you are locked in your room 
shuffling your Chinese symbols and 
passing out Chinese symbols in 
response to incoming Chinese symbols. 
On the basis of the situation as I have 
described it, there is no way you could 
learn any Chinese simply by 
manipulating these formal symbols.17 
By being inside the Chinese Room, the person 
without completely learning Chinese, is able to 
behave as if he does understand Chinese. In a 
language schema, this counts as the syntax. 
Syntax, as compared to semantics, is formalistic 
in nature. It is only composed of values devoid 
of any meaning. The behavior of the one inside 
the Chinese Room only counts as one of syntax, 
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a form not containing meaning. Searle wants to 
point out that the behavior exhibited by the 
person inside the room, in which it seems he 
understood Chinese, lacked semantics, that is, it 
lacked content. The person in the room did not 
really understand Chinese. For him, syntax is not 
sufficient for semantics. This creates a clear 
distinction between computer programs which 
are entirely defined by their formal, or 
syntactical, structure and minds which have 
mental contents. This creates the thesis that a 
machine able to have mental contents is 
impossible.18 
Searle described consciousness through what 
happens when we pinched our skin. According 
to him: 
A few hundred milliseconds after you 
pinched your skin, a second sort of 
thing happened, one that you know 
about without professional assistance. 
You felt a pain... This unpleasant 
sensation had a certain particular sort of 
subjective feel to it, a feel which is 
accessible to you in a way that it is not 
accessible to others around you, This 
accessibility has epistemic 
consequences—you can know about 
your pain in a way that others cannot—
but the subjectivity is ontological rather 
than epistemic. That is, the mode of 
existence of the sensation is a first-
person or subjective mode of existence, 
whereas the mode of existence of the 
neural pathways is a third-person or 
objective mode of existence; the 
pathways exist independently of being 
experienced in a way that a pain does 
not. The feeling of the pain is one of 
the qualia... Furthermore, when you 
pinched your skin, a third sort of thing 
happened. You acquired a behavioral 
disposition you did not previously 
have.19 
It is crucial to note that Searle’s notion of 
consciousness is of subjective nature—not 
epistemic subjective but ontologic subjective. Epistemic 
subjectivity pertains to subjective thoughts that 
one knows to know.  For example, I thought of 
my own thoughts. I have the idea of it. This 
thinking of my own thoughts then is caused yet 
by another round of neuron firings. Ontologic 
subjectivity, however, comprise that feelings we 
get just as we get a particular sensation. It is 
subjectively distinct since it is only observed by 
its thinker. Commonly, it is called as qualia. To 
further look at it, he divided the thought process 
into three. First is the physical activity wherein 
one will react to, for example a pinch. The pinch 
made a neuron reaction in the skin and it travels 
to the brain. This unpleasant sensation has 
epistemic implications—that the subjective feel 
of it is accessible only to the person in a way 
that others cannot. Second is a first-person 
sensation, in this case, it is pain. It was caused by 
the first entirely physical neuronal activity. This 
is also known as the qualia. Third is the 
behavioral disposition caused by the second, 
first-person sensation. The input signals cause 
the pain, and pain in turn causes behavioral 
disposition.  
For Searle, the problem that needs to be focused 
on by philosophy and natural sciences when it 
regards consciousness are those first person and 
subjective feelings.20 
Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Model 
It is important to note that Dennett denies the 
qualia.21 He said: 
Just what are "phenomenal qualities” or 
qualia? (Qualia is just the Latin for 
qualities; the singular is quale, usually 
pronounced kwah '-lay.) They seem 
terribly obvious at first —they're the 
way things look, smell, feel, sound to us 
— but they have a way of changing 
their status or vanishing under 
scrutiny.22 
Qualia, according to Searle, are those second 
features of consciousness. The feeling of 
something at the moment we start to get the 
physical input of, for example, pinching, and by 
that we get the feeling of pain. Dennett denies 
this sort of subjective quality Searle is pointing 
out. To support this, Dennett introduced the 
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Cartesian Theatre. Cartesian theatre is the space 
in which we view our consciousness, or how we 
perceive things in general wherein everything we 
perceive are ‘screened’ or being shown to us 
while we start to be on the centre of that 
consciousness just watching. 23  And, as we see 
things, everything that is around us, we create 
the line or the boundary in which at the other 
side is the self while on the other side is that 
which we are conscious of—this he calls 
Cartesian Materialism. For him, this Cartesian 
theatre, as well as Cartesian materialism, is 
wrong for the reason that it is illusory.24 
Instead, Dennett provided his own positive view 
of consciousness, the ‘multiple drafts model’. 
According to the multiple drafts model, these 
ideas or perceptions are various narrative 
fragments or simply, ‘drafts’, which are at 
different stages of editing.25 For him, some or all 
of these drafts may come together serving 
specific functions. They do not go to a specific 
Central Processing Unit in the brain. They are 
just being ‘edited’ in the brain producing 
thought. To determine which of the drafts are 
conscious or can lead to conscious state is to 
conceive of a Cartesian theatre. To answer the 
instance where it seems like the stream of 
consciousness is flowing in a sequence as if in a 
Cartesian theatre; Dennett claims that the self is 
the centre of narrative gravity.26 Consciousness 
for Dennett would then be similar to a web of 
discourse, similar to its literal sense when we talk 
about the web of the spider or the shell of a 
snail; it works as a house or source of 
livelihood. 27  To complete the model of 
consciousness, according to Dennett, is a sort of 
virtual machine, an evolved computer program 
that shapes the activities of the brain.28 
Dennett’s theory of consciousness is a brand of 
computer functionalism. A computer 
functionalist account of theory of consciousness 
claims the way we think is similar to how basic 
functions and computations make a computer 
application to program. In this light, Dennett 
developed a thesis that a conscious machine is 
possible. By discovering how functions and 
computations undergo in the human mind, we 
can then program it to machines. 
If the self is "just" the Centre of Narrative 
Gravity, and if all the phenomena of human 
consciousness are explicable as "just" the 
activities of a virtual machine realized in the 
astronomically adjustable connections of a 
human brain, then, in principle, a suitably 
"programmed" robot, with a silicon-based 
computer brain, would be conscious, would 
have a self. More aptly, there would be a 
conscious self whose body was the robot 
and whose brain was the computer. This 
implication of my theory strikes some 
people as obvious and unobjectionable. "Of 
course we're machines! We're just very, very 
complicated, evolved machines made of 
organic molecules instead of metal and 
silicon, and we  are conscious, so there can 
be conscious machines — us.29 
Similarities and Dissimilarities 
 
To clearly give a comparative analysis between 
the two theories of mind, one of Searle’s and the 
other of Dennett’s, we must enumerate the 
points where the two theories are similar and 
different. First, let us discuss the similarities. 
1. Both theories endeavor to answer the question of 
mind, specifically, how can the mind be 
described. 
 
The problem is as old as religion where it is an 
assumption that God is capable of divine 
intervention. 30  This intervention implicates the 
control God has in the world permeating through 
basic causal factors that affect this world—
which includes human decisions. But then, 
human decisions comprise free will which bears 
a contradiction to God’s intervention. Of 
course, the problem that stirs with the concept 
of God in the middle is out of the question, 
especially for those skeptics about its very own 
existence. 
 
This free will and everything that is incorporated 
when we talk about the mind, or the very 
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action— thinking, provided a question that is 
answered by philosophers of mind: what is the 
mind, or how can it be described. Searle’s and 
Dennett’s are two theories that are just a part of 
a larger discourse concerning the theory of 
mind. 
 
2. Both theories claim to be scientific, specifically, 
biological. 
 
Since both consider their theory as biological, 
they follow a scientific back-up, notably are 
works by Crick and Edelman31—whom both are 
neuroscientists. Thus, some parts of Crick’s and 
Edelman’s view regarding the brain are 
accepted, including how the brain neurons cause 
behavioral dispositions.32 
More than being similar, Searle’s and Dennett’s 
theories are largely different and contrary. Here 
are the dissimilarities: 
1. For Dennett, mind is reducible to computational 
functions while Searle says it’s not. 
 
Dennett adheres to a computational view of the 
human mind wherein it is possible for thoughts, 
as human mind’s products, to be reduced to 
functions, thus implying the possibility of a set 
of functions constituting the human mind that is 
observable by us in a third-person perspective. 
This set of functions, then can serve as a basis 
for us to produce an artificial intelligent being. 
Whereas, Searle argues against this reducibility 
by stating that computations are not intrinsic in 
nature, that which includes the human mind. 
Searle claims that physics, the natural world, and 
the human mind have no necessary 
computational functions. We attribute 
computations in causal relations partaking in 
physics, but this does not fully interpret the 
nature of physics. The case is the same with the 
human mind wherein there is more difficulty in 
seeing its intrinsic causal relations. 
Computations then, for Searle, are only observer 
relative, such that its value solely lies on what is 
observed in the third person. The main difficulty 
arises from the distinction between how the two 
are derived, computations and human mind. 
While it is possible to attribute computational 
functions to physics as it is observed in the third 
person; the human mind is observed in the first 
person. Thus, the unbridgeable gap: human as it 
is observed in the first person and computability 
as it is observer-relative. This emphasis on the 
first person by Searle leads us to the second 
difference. 
 
2. Searle claims that this subjective quality of 
consciousness, specifically qualia, is the main 
issue we must pursue when dealing with the 
philosophical problem of consciousness while 
Dennett scraps the very idea of its existence. 
 
Searle elaborated consciousness by dividing it 
into three phases. (1) The first is the actual 
physical contact wherein stimuli begin to react 
and neuronal processes start its activity. 
Neurons fire and at this phase, brain scanner, 
and other machines that are capable of 
interpreting neuronal activity, can be used to 
observe what happens in the body when we 
think. At this phase, we get the sensation of the 
action. (2) After the neurons processed and 
brought about sensation, there comes the feeling 
of it. A phenomena outside that is purely 
subjective, and rather than epistemic subjective, 
it is actually ontologic subjective. Epistemic 
subjectivity pertains to subjective thoughts that 
one knows to know.  Ontologic subjectivity, 
however, is subjectively distinct since it is only 
observed by its thinker. Because of its ontologic 
subjective nature, it escapes the possibility for it 
to be under the study of objective science. These 
feelings, then cause emotions and also causing 
the third (3), after the sensation is produced by 
bodily processes, and the feeling is produced in 
consciousness by these bodily processes, 
behaviors arise.33 Behavioral disposition is the most 
empirically observable of the three. These are 
the bodily actions we do after we get sensations. 
Muscles move as nerve endings give commands. 
Searle’s theory provided a window to answer the 
old question wherein there is an explanatory gap 
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between input stimulus (in Searle’s: sensation) 
and behavioral disposition. 
 
Dennett does not want to adopt Searle’s purely 
subjective interpretation of consciousness, and 
scrapped the idea of it. For him, our minds work 
only within the objective strata. Input stimuli 
enter the body through the neurons, the brain or 
spine reacts, then behaviors occur. If we are to 
use Searle’s draft, Dennett will only consider the 
first and the third phase. Dennett’s claim tends 
to forget that there is an old problem, such that 
there is a gap between the input stimulus and 
behavior. This gap is mainly rooted from the 
large difference between simple neuron firings 
and complex mental activity, such includes 
having ideas, feelings, decisions, etc. Dennett 
answered this question, while still sticking to his 
claim of the computational theory of mind, 
using the multiple drafts model. And, to how it 
lies between sensation and behavioral 
disposition; according to him, there is a virtual 
machine within our brain that processes these 
functions coming in and out.34 
 
3. Dennett believes that a conscious machine is 
possible while Searle believes otherwise. 
 
These two widely opposed theories are both 
conclusions of Searle’s and Dennett’s pursuit of 
the correct theory of mind. On the one hand, 
Dennett, because he treats mental functions as 
reducible to functions such that we can derive 
conjectures and formulations to mathematically 
analyze and predict it, highly believes that we 
can produce a conscious artificial intelligence. By 
being ‘conscious’, it does not merely pass some 
certain test such as the Turing test, but it means 
that it can act, think, and behave like us, 
humans. This can be achieved in the time when 
we understood how the human consciousness 
works; this then can be engineered and applied 
to machines producing an artificial intelligence 
(AI). On the other hand, Searle believes that the 
problem is whether we can achieve full 
understanding of consciousness. Without this 
understanding of consciousness, we don’t have 
enough formulations for creating AI. Searle is 
not completely against the idea of an artificially 
intelligent robot. But for him, we must first 
tackle the problem of qualia, which, according to 
him must be the focus for answering the 
problem of consciousness. Qualia is still an 
untapped area within the third person discourse; 
but in the first person, Searle claims that we 
know of it.35 
 
Scientific or Unscientific 
Both Searle and Dennett are trying to be 
objective as possible when consciousness is 
being talked about. Both are referring to 
consciousness as thinking, sentience, and that 
anything that we talked about when talking 
about the mind. 
But, let us analyze the consciousness they are 
referring to. Both claim that theirs is scientific. 
We must dissect the two theories’ being 
scientific since this attribute gives legitimacy and 
keeps us close to the empirical. So, are their 
theories scientific or not? Here are a number of 
factors on how we can distinguish something 
scientific or unscientific.36 
1. Science tends to progress. 
2. Science asks how. 
3. It uses a reference frame, thus it relies 
on measurements. 
4. Verification Principle. If it is analytically 
or empirically verifiable, it is scientific. 
5. Popper’s Falsification. Instead of relying 
on verification, if it can be falsified, it is 
scientific.37 
 
1. Science tends to progress. 
 
Does Dennett’s or Searle’s theory progresses? 
Both theories according to the two have their 
roots from neuroscience, thus the physical and 
biological origins. We can say that both theories 
are the progression being talked about in the 
progress. Dennett’s path, Strong AI, is quite older 
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than him, and it sticks to the computationalist 
and the functionalist interpretation of the mind. 
Critics claim, including Searle, that Strong AI 
has not really progressed, hence is in a stagnant 
phase. Largely, this is due to the Penrose 
hypothesis stating that Gödel’s Incompleteness 
theorem provides strong evidence against strong 
AI. Its adherents will deny that and will probably 
cite ASIMO, SIRI, etc. as empirical proofs for 
the progress scientists had in creating artificial 
intelligence. 38  Searle would still point out that 
these examples of thinking robot does not 
qualify for being conscious like us since it does 
not have that qualia.  
 
Searle’s theory, biological naturalism, is rather 
new. He made his theory to be apart from 
dualism or materialism, although the theory has 
slight leaning with dualism according to most of 
Searle’s critics.39 Searle’s theory is more unique 
from other theories. It has a focus to 
neuroscience leaning the theory with 
materialism; but with neuroscience, Searle 
admits exclusively subjective qualia creating the 
dualistic picture. Since Searle’s theory places an 
emphasis on qualia and since it has insufficient 
supports and proofs 40  for it is only accessible 
through subjective experience, Searle’s theory 
does not or has not progressed. 
 
But, the two theories are fairly young and it is 
possible that the two just have not reached the 
phase where there is an observable progress. 
 
2. Science explains how. 
 
Explaining mechanism is one of the features of 
science. It illustrates how event A causes event 
B as well as underlying events that undergo with 
the whole process. Dennett’s theory, according 
to him, is scientific on the basis of its biological 
foundation. 41  Consciousness, for him, is a 
product of biological processes, generally. But, it 
is also according to Dennett that religion and 
other social phenomena are also biological, with 
the same case as consciousness. This bears light 
to what brand of consciousness Dennett talks 
about and how he can see the world. Every 
factor, including social factors that affect 
humans are biological and all of these are 
reducible to functions. That is how Dennett 
closed the gap between the soft science and the 
hard science. 
 
Neuroscience can stand on its own when asked 
to explain how. Strong AI gets its explication of 
mechanism from the framework of 
neuroscience; but, it is not accurately the same. 
The problem with this brand of functionalism is 
that its process, or its mechanism, is out of sight. 
It is in a black box, so to speak, hence the term 
black box functionalism.42 What we only get are 
names and definitions cluttered to serve the 
theory and the mechanism as a conceptual map 
based from theories of neuroscience. The 
mechanism derived from neuroscience is twice 
or more removed from empirical means since it 
relies on abstract definitions that are only other 
products from different functionalist theories. 
Thus, Dennett’s theory, if not, duly lacks the 
ability to explain how. 
 
Searle attempted to give light on the old 
problem, finding out the mechanism between 
the input, or the mental state, and the output, or 
the behaviors. This is the ontologically 
subjective factor of consciousness, or simply 
qualia. Searle’s theory’s biological nature comes 
from his sub-thesis that higher level mental 
contents are caused by lower level neuronal 
processes. Lower level neuronal processes act as 
the input. Higher level mental contents include 
the qualia, and acts as in-between input and 
output. Behavioral disposition is the output. 43 
So, how does it really explain? The mechanism 
of the input is explained and is being explained 
through neuroscience. The mechanism of the 
output is sufficiently explained through direct 
empirical means and behaviorism. The in-
between, as Searle claims the qualia, has 
difficulty in showing us what its mechanism is. 
Searle is quite sure about its existence. We feel it. 
We genuinely know about it. But, even though 
we feel it, we are not really sure how it works. 
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We can get a grasp of it, but it is only that what 
we know to know—it is only epistemic 
subjective. This epistemic subjectivity can be 
subjected to third person scrutiny by using 
neurological tools. But, an ontologic subjective 
phenomenon, the in-between input and output 
can only be accessed through the self, the 
subjective. This makes the mechanism of 
Searle’s qualia rather impossible to identify.  
 
3. It uses a reference frame, thus relying on 
measurements. 
 
Another factor science has to support its 
legitimacy is its accuracy and precision due to its 
use of measurements. Measurements of certain 
objects or subjects are identified with its relation 
to standard measurements, such as International 
System, and basic units.  
 
Important parameters in both Searle’s and 
Dennett’s theories are immeasurable. We cannot 
yet subject Searle’s qualia or Dennett’s multiple 
drafts to strict scientific standards. 
 
4. Science can be verified as in Verification 
Principle or falsified as in Popper’s 
Falsification Theory.44 
 
We always know about consciousness, but how 
can we verify it? This is a problem we have in 
pursuing a science of consciousness. But, 
Dennett, since denying the distinct subjectivity, 
claims that we can verify consciousness through 
neuron processes. Dennett’s framework is 
simple. There are neurons and neuron firings, 
and then there are the behaviors. That’s just it. 
Dennett denies a third party that may be named 
qualia, or maybe consciousness. This verification 
from neuroscience and computationalism is 
continually tested to successfully create a better 
and conscious AI. But, Searle claims that what 
Dennett talks about is not how we tackle the 
problem of consciousness. 
 
Searle’s theory is impossible to verify 
scientifically by the third person, whereas in the 
first person he claims that it is a common sense 
to us.45 Dennett does not support this as he still 
question the accountability our senses give to us. 
The description Searle provides when he talks 
about our cognition of qualia, for Dennett, does 
not suffice. In a gist, to verify Dennett’s claim 
on consciousness and its mechanism, we need to 
heavily rely on the scientifically verified 
mechanism provided to us by neuroscience and 
computational operations. While there is a rather 
still vague connection between Dennett’s theory 
of mind and neuroscience with 
computationalism, Searle’s theory has a long way 
to go to get in close with the traditional science 
since traditional science currently puts its trust 
to the third person interpretations. 
 
The case is quite the same in terms of whether 
the two theories can be falsified or not. There 
are also difficulties. The big problem lies in the 
observability of the concepts used in the 
theories.  While, Dennett deals with an 
unobservable black box functionalism together 
with an imaginary virtual machine; Searle deals 
with an exclusively for subjective-observations-
only attribute of consciousness. 
The fact whether a certain theory is scientific or 
not is a larger problem in philosophy of science, 
simply known as problem of demarcation.46 So, 
the categorization of Dennett’s and Searle’s 
theory requires clarification to the problem of 
demarcation. But, if we are referring to the 
traditional sense of science and put it to the 
same level with other sciences that has 
consensus to be considered as scientific such as 
biology or chemistry, Dennett’s and Searle’s are 
far from being scientific. It can be that the 
theories the two are pushing are still at a very 
young age or the two theories are simple 
imagination. 
Are the two theories really biological? Biology is 
most commonly defined as science pertaining to 
the study of living organisms. In its most general 
sense, it may also include the social factors 
acting according to the living organism; and, 
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more closely, treating both as biological since 
they both talk about theory of mind dealing with 
a vital factor in a study of life, in general.  
But, the current tradition we have of biology, it 
requires a reductive justification from chemistry. 
This would mean that proofs and explanations 
of certain biological theories need to be 
supported by explanations derived from 
chemistry such as oxygen fueling metabolism or 
the Krebs cycle of cellular respiration. With 
chemistry as a requirement, biology, then 
becomes a stricter discipline, then cutting off the 
softer side of science including the social 
sciences. With reductive justification from 
chemistry, Dennett’s and Searle’s have too many 
missing links to create a sufficient explanation of 
a theory of mind, according to the current 
tradition of biology. 
Dualism and Non-Dualism 
 
To know whether a certain theory of mind is 
dualistic or non-dualistic is to know the mode of 
explanation that certain theory will undergo. For 
a certain theory to become dualistic or not 
means it has accepted principles that are 
necessary for that theory. Dualism presupposes 
two distinct attributions or agents that are 
coexisting, and somehow, interacting; while, 
monism scraps either one of the two attributions 
or agents. Dualism is unpopular with the 
scientific community, especially those 
considering the discipline to be more strict since 
dualism advances the idea that there is more to 
what traditional empirical science can 
understand thus delegitimizing science’s 
authority; although, not all dualist accepts 
attributions or agents outside the grasp of 
science.47 
Searle’s critics are imposing a label on him 
stating that he is a closet dualist. Dennett is 
proclaiming himself as a monist materialist, but 
a few still describe him as also a closet dualist. Is 
it really possible then to present a theory of mind without 
resorting to dualism, in any form? 
Dennett claims that his theory is a monist theory 
simply by denying the existence of the other 
agent, the qualia part of the mind. The sort of 
consciousness is denied by Dennett and was 
pointed out by Searle that Dennett is making a 
counterintuitive claim. So if Dennett denies the 
existence of another agent unobservable 
empirically, how is he a closet dualist? Since 
Dennett should account every question targeted 
to consciousness, this will have to include 
questions regarding the stream of consciousness 
we have, the distinct subjective feeling, or the 
actual process between neuronal sensations, 
mental processes (consciousness), and physical 
behaviors, he is forced to introduce a new 
concept that is rather removed from the strict 
empirical standard we get from traditional 
science. This is his so-called virtual machine. 
Dennett’s virtual machine has slight similarities 
with Descartes’ evil demon outside our mind. 
Virtual machine acts as the main processor that 
directs input stimulus and other properties of 
consciousness into an empirical behavioral 
disposition. That creation of another non-
empirical entity, even though, according to 
Dennett the machine is within the territory of 
computer functionalism, is one signal that a 
theory is falling to dualism. 
Searle denies being labelled as either a dualist or 
a materialist. He is not a dualist as he insists that 
his theory is entirely biological. Critics point to 
Searle’s concept ontologic subjectivity to rest the 
claim that he is a closet dualist. Ontologic 
subjectivity, or simply the qualia, seemingly is 
another agent that pushes for a dualistic theory. 
But, it is not the case that if something is that we 
cannot find anything about, it is already totally 
different, thus subject to dualistic variation. 
Searle insists that this ontologic subjectivity 
must be accepted as a part or subdivision of our 
entire biological construct. But, for him, this 
biological construction, including consciousness 
and the ontologic subjective property of it, must 
not be considered as entirely physical—because 
mental constructs are really not. But, if that 
ontologic subjective property is rather different 
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to the point that it can’t pass within the territory 
of materialism; is the theory implying one brand 
of dualism, simply property dualism? 
In a gist, Dennett, while proclaiming himself as a 
monist materialist has his theory contain traces 
of dualism pointing to his concept of virtual 
machines. Searle, while his theory looks like a 
dualistic theory, maintains that his concept of 
ontologic subjective feature of consciousness is 
not independent from our whole biological 
construct to the point that his theory will be 
deemed as dualistic. Although, it is also not 
entirely physical as what materialists would 
suppose. 
The Chinese Room Implication 
According to the current tradition we have of 
science, it is rather hard to accept Dennett’s and 
Searle’s theory to be scientific. It is not enough 
that a theory has employed scientific concepts 
for it to be considered scientific. It needs to 
establish scientific and/or empirical connection 
with the scientific concept it employed. There 
are also some difficulties to explain 
comprehensively what consciousness is without 
being dualistic.  
How about artificial intelligence? We have 
insufficient knowledge when it pertains to 
artificial intelligence since at the pillars of our 
questions; we are still in a debacle for certain 
basic definitions such in conscious or intelligence.  
But, Dennett strongly believes that a conscious 
machine is possible. Artificial Intelligence is 
possible. This is by fully understanding the 
complete functional system our thinking process 
has, that in a sense, we are conscious, and 
applying this system in a computer program. 
The process is easy to grasp since tests and 
developments are currently being made, 
especially in first world countries like Japan. 48 
But, Searle contests these kinds of hypothesis. 
Searle strongly believes that computer 
functionalism is not enough to create a 
conscious machine. He expounded on this claim 
by using his thought experiment, the Chinese 
Room. It implies that a machine may mimic or 
adapt perfectly to an environment, language, or 
social order like a conscious human being but it 
does not really understand anything.  
To further understand what Searle is really 
talking about, it is helpful to know the 
distinction between syntax and semantics. While 
syntax pertains to the form, in the Chinese 
Room case it refers to the set of questions and 
the set of answers going on in the room; 
semantics pertain to the content, in the Chinese 
Room case it refers to the meaning of the 
questions and answers going on in the room and 
it refers to what the Chinese language really 
meant. To know this distinction between syntax 
and semantics is to understand the distance 
between them.  
We can fully grasp the syntax, in Searle’s theory 
of mind this would be the neuroscience and 
behavioral disposition; but, we are wading as to 
the semantics is, only except with ourselves 
through subjectivity. Since Searle’s concept of 
ontologic subjectivity is not possible to be 
understood by the third person, another 
question enters the query: how can we, as third 
persons, really know others semantically? Is it 
just impossible?  
What is Consciousness? 
After seeing how Dennett and Searle view 
consciousness, it is now quite clear to me that 
the two are actually referring to two different 
things. I named these two brands of 
consciousness as operational consciousness and sui 
generis consciousness to clearly distinguish them 
from each other. First is Dennett’s brand of 
consciousness. We need to take note what 
Dennett is trying to talk about when referring to 
consciousness. 
1. It is purely functional, thus it only 
consists of syntax.  
2. It scraps the idea that qualia exists, thus 
the ontologic subjectivity, as in Searle’s, 
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which is exclusively and uniquely 
accessed by the self is also non-existent. 
3. It includes in its explanation the 
presence of a virtual machine that is yet 
again purely functional and works as a 
CPU in us. 
It can be said that what Dennett is referring to is 
what I may call an operational consciousness. The 
term operational pertains to process or a series 
of actions for achieving a result. It reflects the 
kind of consciousness Dennett is talking about. 
Operational Consciousness is purely functional, 
does not accommodate qualia, and it must have a 
sort of virtual machine to act as its main 
processor. This is also the brand of 
consciousness a conscious robot must have, if it 
came to a point where it can ask itself about why 
is he thinking, why he is afraid, or that certain 
feeling of pain he is having. The programs are 
working on its own and developing recycled and 
almost original scenarios and problem deriving 
from all of the data contained in the robot. It is 
also developing reactions it mimics from its 
environment. The robot is conscious in that 
example. But, the robot does not have what 
Searle is talking about: Qualia. 
Qualia is the key concept we have of how 
Searle’s consciousness differ from Dennett. 
Searle’s consciousness is described as follows. 
1. It is not entirely material, but it is not a 
sort of ghost that is removed from our 
biological construction. It is an entirely 
subjective property that is included in 
our biological construction. 
2. It has an ontologic subjective property, 
known as qualia, wherein this property is 
not observable by the third person, and 
cannot be as it is different from 
epistemic subjective—wherein we can 
report, in a third person, what we have 
subjectively. 
Searle’s theory of mind can be referred to as sui 
generis consciousness. The consciousness Searle is 
referring to is unique compared to how 
consciousness is modelled in various theories 
such as dualism or materialism. It has not 
necessarily fallen to the set of all physical or 
material, but it is part of the whole biological 
construction. This is fairly hard to accept if the 
whole biological construction is assumed to be 
entirely physical and objective.  
This brand of consciousness breaks itself away 
from the possibility of a conscious machine. 
This is due to qualia. The fact that consciousness 
incorporates qualia, an ontologic subjective 
feeling, deems impossible that a machine has 
consciousness. A machine, even if it already can 
have feelings as produced by multiple functional 
processes inside its own CPU, cannot have that 
ontologic subjective feeling.  
What then is consciousness? We have to accept 
that consciousness has different brands. It is not 
entirely of us. Consciousness is not only that 
human consciousness, we distinctively feel.  
But, between Dennett and Searle, who both 
pointed that the consciousness they are talking 
about is the consciousness we truly have, who is 
pointing out right? Since the two 
consciousnesses they have been talking about is 
different from each other, which brand of 
consciousness describes human consciousness? 
Looking at our consciousness, it really does 
seem that Searle’s and Dennett’s theory fits. 
There is only one contradiction left that cannot 
compatibilize the two theories. One has qualia 
and the other one has none. We can have 
another point of distinction: life. 
Life is a distinguishing factor that demarcates us 
from non-living things. But, how can we really 
know that one is distinctively alive? How can we 
really distinguish ourselves from the non-living 
things? Biology can straight face answer the 
question of demarcation between something 
alive and something not. But, as time passes and 
technology progresses, this demarcation 
provided by Biology is starting to fade. 
Monerans, Protozoans, and Bacteria have the 
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attributions required to be labelled as living. 
They grow and they multiply. But, it is also the 
case of a biological virus, or a computer virus. Is 
it living? Most biologists will deny it, but it is 
appealing to accept that these viruses are alive. 
This can be answered by Searle’s brand of 
consciousness, sui generis consciousness. Sui 
generis consciousness can be a distinguishing 
factor of whether one is alive or not.  
This can lead to more problems since if sui 
generis consciousness has become the basis of life 
we will then have to question whether animals 
or plants have that consciousness. In terms of 
animals, it is not hard to assume that they may 
not be any different to us, humans. But, plants 
have a rather directive method of growth and 
behavior. There are no signs that it is conscious, 
in terms of how animals, and us, are conscious. 
Additionally, it is even harder to base our 
theories on qualia since its very own existence is 
still being put into question by other 
philosophers, particularly Dennett.  
So maybe, Dennett is talking real, when he is 
talking about operational consciousness. 
Treating our consciousness as operational meant 
also to discard the distinguishing mark we have 
against non-living things. We are like them (the 
conscious machines), and they are like us to the 
point that the only comparison is going to be 
the presence of human flesh. Everything then is 
reducible to functions. And, since everything is 
reducible to functions, everything is also 
translatable and applicable to be contained in 
other mediums. Reducing everything to 
functions is helpful to a theory making it simpler 
as it discards complex unempirical concepts 
such as life. Or, that very instance where 
everything is reducible to functions could be life 
itself—in Dennett’s terms. 
We really have a long way to go when it comes 
to understanding what consciousness, or 
specifically what human consciousness really is. 
We have clues. We are aware of its existence. 
But, we are having a really hard time describing 
and defining it. It is largely due to the fact that 
there are instances in ourselves that we are being 
deceived by ourselves. The fact that we can 
always see our nose anywhere we point our eyes 
is not known by most people because our mind 
chooses where it looks at. The things we 
perceive, the way how our mind constructs 
patterns and combinations for us to direct our 
perceptions at is another way our perceptions 
are manipulating us. But, this is normally how 
our brain works. To understand all about it, in 
the end, we still have to rely on a stricter 
discipline and create a science of consciousness. 
But to create this science of consciousness, 
Dennett’s theory can safely pass as scientific if it 
leaves out his virtual machine and focused only 
on the materialist side of his theory. In this case, 
his theory will be strictly neuroscientific with an 
outright denial of the concept of consciousness. 
This big problem though is that he is leaving out 
the huge chunk of problem we must actually be 
talking about, consciousness, the distinct 
subjectivity of it, and the sui generis characteristic 
of it.  
Although, Searle is on point putting an emphasis 
on qualia in the discourse of consciousness, it is 
rather hard to admit it in a stricter analysis, as in 
hard science. This is the problem of ontologic 
subjectivity; we distinctively are aware of it, but 
we cannot explain or report it in a third person. 
In that case, we are only explaining the epistemic 
subjectivity.   
In reaction to Searle’s model, how can we really 
understand consciousness? 
1. We can just leave the fact that there are 
some things left in the subjective, and 
thus we cannot really understand 
consciousness in its entirety. The 
problem that we cannot know 
consciousness as in a third person will 
just rest. 
a. We can treat consciousness just as a 
point of distinction we have against 
probable non-conscious beings. 
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b. We can fully understand it through 
spiritualism, or total self-meditation. 
It should be noted that this is a 
common answer from religions and 
the concept God may occasionally 
arise. And, it should also be noted 
that accounts derived from the 
subjective are dubious and 
unreliable. 
 
2. We can just drop ontologic subjectivity 
from the whole theory and treat the 
epistemic subjectivity as an answer and a 
medium to know what we know as 
qualia. In this case, we can really 
understand the forenamed. We report 
what we distinctively know of our qualia 
little by little until other reports of their 
own qualia can create a big social report 
where synthesis and analysis can be 
drawn upon.  
a. Although, this leaves out the very 
problem Searle is talking about.  
b. In this case, we are still tapping in 
the dark, since again, accounts from 
the subjective are dubious and 
unreliable. 
 
3. Or, we can just altogether leave Searle’s 
theory in the trash, and scrap the very 
complex idea of qualia. 
Conclusion 
How can we really know consciousness? Is it 
really impossible to understand it 
comprehensively given that we have to account 
qualia? Or is it really just a simple, functional 
system that is going on in our brain? 
It is really hard to answer all of those questions 
given that along the way, we are still clueless 
about almost everything we find. We lack 
particular distinctions such as between machines 
and not machines, thinking and not thinking, or 
living or not living. 
For me, what we know of consciousness can at 
least become a point of distinction between 
machines and non-machines, thinking and non-
thinking, or living or non-living. This is not 
defining it, but this is only to make 
consciousness as an attribution. Consciousness 
is possible to be present in non-machines, and is 
not in machines. It is present in thinking and not 
in non-thinking. And, it is present in a living 
being, and not in the non-living.  
Machine and Non-Machine 
Machine is defined here as that artificially made 
object to proceed with several tasks. 
Consciousness is not present in machines. Thus, 
it is possible for it to be present in non-
machines. But, how about in a case where 
beings are artificially created and made to be 
conscious? The answer will rely on the process 
how it is conscious. Is it operational conscious? 
If it is just operational conscious, it is considered 
as a machine; but, if it is sui generis conscious, it is 
not a machine. Artificial sui generis consciousness 
is possible if we use biological raw materials to 
create a new being. The principle is the same in 
a science-fiction called Doctor Who49. Every being 
that is sui generis conscious will always have a 
biological foundation. There are robots planted 
with human brains; conscious clones are entirely 
created from stem cells; and a conscious vehicle 
(time machine) has some sort of biological heart 
at its core. 
Thinking and Non-Thinking 
Consciousness entails thinking; again, we are 
referring to sui generis consciousness. Of course, 
this will face serious problems as even with the 
concept thinking, problems arise when it comes 
to entailing it with consciousness since it does 
seem not to work in all types of human beings. 
Does it apply on babies? On a person in a 
coma? Or, simply a sleeping person? Does it 
apply to particular diagnosed persons? If it will 
be based on a sui generis consciousness, it will 
apply to all types of human beings. Do note that 
sui generis consciousness does not only entail the 
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directional characteristic of consciousness. It 
puts an emphasis on qualia, on ontologic 
subjectivity. And, it is present on all types of 
human beings. 
Living and Non-Living 
This view is most likely unappealing to 
traditional biologists as this establishes a 
standard between living and non-living. It is 
important to note that biology, as a hard science, 
is largely concerned about whether something is 
alive or not thus it must rest on their territory. 
But, there is a diminishing demarcation between 
living and non-living; something that grows or 
something that multiples can be regarded as 
alive. The criterion, of course, is not simple as 
that; but due to an increasing variety of species 
and increasing number of artificial beings; the 
criterion is falling short. Is ASIMO alive? Or 
maybe, SIRI? Are viruses considered alive? What 
about computer viruses? Or, what about even 
more advanced computer viruses? 
We must re-establish what distinguishes living 
from non-living. And, consciousness, 
particularly ontologic subjectivity, can supply for it. 
Of course, this will lead to more problems and 
clarifications such as pertaining to whether 
plants are ontologic subjectively conscious, or 
whether animals are ontologic subjectively 
conscious. 
To wrap it up: “Why sui generis consciousness 
suits better to describe human consciousness 
instead of operational consciousness?” 
To answer this question, I have put a criterion to 
distinguish human consciousness from other 
consciousness.  
1. Sufficiency of Explanation. It must 
explain what we, in the common sense, 
know. We are aware that we have 
consciousness. We think. We have 
feelings. We have the most basic idea of 
what consciousness must be.  
2. Pragmatic Picture of Reality. It must 
fit in the social reality. Those two 
theories can have different social 
implications, but only one can fit in the 
reality we have. 
Sui generis consciousness fits with the first 
criterion. We had our first clue: that entirely 
subjective experience of thinking. We may not 
grasp and understand it fully, but we are 
perfectly aware of it. This subjective experience 
is left out by Dennett. We cannot just leave out 
in our explanations what we, in the common-
sense, are aware to have. Of course, we can still 
doubt what we know to know, since there are 
times that we are deceived by our own senses, 
but still, we have that feeling of knowing; as 
what Searle points out.  
In the matter of what sort of society the two 
theories will create, Searle’s will create a 
demarcation between the conscious and the 
non-conscious. Dennett’s will do otherwise it 
will create a surrounding with no conscious 
distinctions. Everything will just be reducible to 
functions and everything is just mathematical. 
This kind of society does really translate to ours.
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